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trying to be fair 
Clearly, howeve] 
always rely with 
to the inspector the judge had been unfair to Mr Johns.27 
-, there is no magic formula upon which the courts can 
both certainty and confidence. 
STEPHEN TODD, LL.M. 
Senior Lecturer, University of Canterbury 
" [I9821 1 WLR at p.368. 
THE HONOURABLE D. F .  QUIGLEY'S RESIGNATION 
STRICTLY POLITICAL - NOT CONSTITUTIONAL 
June 1982 will be remembered for the Quigley affair. Precipitated by Mr 
D. F. Quigley's address to the Young Nationals on June 7,l the Prime 
Minister responded with the ultimatum that the Minister either publicly 
apologise to his Cabinet colleagues or resign. Mr Quigley resigned. The 
Prime Minister: "[Hlis speech went 'well beyond' the limits of collective 
responsibility in which cabinet ministers worked. . . [I]t went beyond that 
which was acceptable from a Cabinet Minister unless accompanied by his 
re~ignation."~ "Bear in mind that we are not talking about a backbencher." 
Said the Prime Minister: "[Tlhere is a real difference between what a 
backbencher could say and what a Minister could say."3 
It  is this appeal to the constitution avowedly vindicating the Prime 
Minister's reaction that distinguishes this political controversy from the 
many to have occurred since the closing of the thirty-seventh Parliament. 
The reference in the Prime Minister's statements is to the proclaimed con- 
stitutional convention that Minister's are 'collectively responsible' for all 
that passes in Cabinet - shed of euphemism, meaning that a Minister 
who disagrees with a Cabinet decision must either resist making known 
his dissent or resign. This at least is the theory Mr Muldoon averred: 
in the event of public disunity a Minister's resignation is constitutionally 
imperative rather than merely commendable, honourable or even in the 
Government's best interests to e n f ~ r c e . ~  Thus depending upon the par- 
ticular construction one might wish to give Mr Quigley's offending speech 
("did it or did it not breach the doctrine of collective ministerial responsi- 
bility?") it was simply a matter of the constitution claiming an able but 
dissentient Minister. 
But is not this notion of collective responsibility obligating a Minister's 
resignation novel? Fortunately, the political scientists were able to assist: 
1 " 
. . . designed to stimulate discussion. . .it is most important that a group such as 
this has the opportunity to debate the issues of the day. . .and to appreciate the 
role the government plays in the decision-making process". Christchurch Press 15 
June 1982, reproducing the full text of the Minister's speech. 
' Christchurch Press, 15 June 1982. 
Ibid. 
' See generally, S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and Ahinistrative Law (2nd ed., 
1973), at 168-177. 
"The convention of collective cabinet responsibility . . . [though] rarely 
acted on . . . dates back to around the turn of the century, according to 
Professor Keith Jackson, of the University of Canterbury, . . ."fi And 
furthermore: 
"Political scientists . . . also agreed on the critical ground-rules of the collective 
responsibility principle: that it is not a legal concept; that the prerogative of 
deciding when it has been transgressed is the Prime Minister's, and his alone. . . 
So the present Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, was perfectly entitled to dismiss 
Mr Quigley from his cabinet, it was freely conceded, . . ."" 
Whilst further conceding that Mr MuIdoon's action was "apparently . . . 
unique in modern New Zealand political history", these commentators 
nonetheless maintained there existed a New Zealand precedent to support 
the convention. They cited Willian~ Downie Stewart who, in 1933, resigned 
a\ Minister of Finance and Customs in the Forbes-Coates Coalition Gov- 
ernment following his dissent on a financial decision his Cabinet colIeagues 
f a v o ~ r e d . ~  
However the constit~~tional convention to which the Prime Minister 
eagerly referred as justifying his ultimatum, and which the political scien- 
tbts afiirmed, is fictional. In New Zealand (and probably also the United 
Kingdom4) the notion that Cabinet must stand as one on the l?olicies it 
adopts has never been more than a rule of pragmatic politics. The fact 
that Cabinet solidarity i\ seldom found wanting is explained easily e n o ~ g h . ~  
Not only is loyalty to the parliamentary team the expected price of pro- 
motion to Cabinet (hence "the Prime Minister's task", reflected Harold 
Mrilson in 1972, ". . . to get a consesus of Cabinet or he cannot reasonably 
a+ for loyalty . . ."lo) but known also is the political disfavour and loss 
of public confidence that is inevitably the price of disloyalty.ll 
Viewed thus the proclaimed principle of collective ministerial respomi- 
bility is not secured by one of the hallmark characteristics distinguishing 
convention from mere political usage or expediency: namely, constitu- 
tional neces,ity. Or as three members of the Supreme Court of Canada 
New Zealund Herald, 21 June 1982. 
' Ibid, referring also to Alan McRobie of the Christchurch Teachers' College. 
' See infra. 
See D. L. Ellis, Collective Ministerial Responsibility and Collective Solidarity 
[I9801 Public Law 367, observing the "dramatic 'metamorphosis' " collective re- 
sponsibility has undergone in the United Kingdom over the past 100 years: "from 
being a tool of the Constitution, it has become a tool of the ~olitical party" (at 
p. 395). See also I. G. Eagles, Cabinet Secrets as Evidence [I9801 Public Law 263, 
at 266-68. 
But cf. Ellis, ibid., observing the breakdown of collective responsibility in the 
United Kingdom; even if it "superficially appears" that collective responsibility is 
being upheld "the underlying motives for this policy may well be more coldly 
political" (at p. 395). See also Att-Gen. v Jonathan Cape [I9761 1 QB 752, [I9751 
3 All ER 484, at 495 per Lord Widgery CJ: "I find overwhelming evidence that 
the doctrine of joint responsibility. . .is on occasion ignored. 
lo New Statesman, May 5 1972 (quoted by Ellis, ibid., .at 372). 
llE.g. see K. J. Scott, The New Zealand Constitution (1962), at 159, commenting 
on the embarrassment Downie Stewart caused the 1931 Coalition Government and 
which eventually led to his resignation (infra). 
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couched the test recently, "it mu\t play a necessary con.sfitutiona1 role."'" 
In contrast, in his celebrated work Tlze New Zeulund Constitutiorz 
(1962) the late Professor K. J .  Scott reflected that "the [very] establish- 
ment" of collective responsibility "was dictated by self-interest": 
"It was a protection against the Sovereign preventing him from learning of the 
divisions in Cabinet, and thus lessening his chances of intriguing to widen any 
splits that might exist in Cabinet. Cabinet later used collective responsibility against 
Parliament. In days when party discipline was not strict many backbenchers who 
usually supported Ministers would sometimes vote against them, and would be 
more likely to vote against a single Minister to force him to resign than to vote 
against a whole ministry and bring down a government."l3 
Professor Scott recognised however that the enforced practice nowadays 
of Cabinet solidarity "is usually regarded" as a convention of the constitu- 
tion. "But probably", he advised, "it should be regarded as one of the 
ruler of party expediency that are not also conventions of the constitu- 
tion."14 Sir John Anderson, a former British Home Secretary, expressed 
a similar view in 1946: "Collective responsibility . . . is not in the . . . 
strict sense a constitutional principle at all. . . . It is, from one point of 
view, little more than a rule of practical expediency."15 And United King- 
dom Cabinet Secretary Sir John Hunt, under cross-examination in the 
Crosstnan Dairies case, replied "no" to the question whether he regarded 
collective responsibility to be a convention: although "an important part" 
of the constitution, it was, he proffered, no more than "a reality."'" 
Indeed, even as a mere "reality" it was less than perfect observed Lord 
Widgery CJ in that case, for not even Ministers themselves - those most 
directly affected and whom collective responsibility was ultimately sup- 
posed to protect - wholeheartedly supported the practice of Cabinet 
unanirnity.17 
Underlying theje reflections are two thoughts. First, that Ministers must 
'speak as one' on important policy matters does not impose an obligation 
"founded in conscience", to use Professor Wade's description of the 
psychology enjoining obedience to convention.ls It has little or nothing to 
do with standards of political conduct critical to the Westminster constitu- 
tional democracy; and concerned with neither constitutional necessity nor 
" R e  Amendment o f  the Constitutio~t of Canada (1981) 125 LDR (3d) 1 (S.C.C.) 
at 114 per Laskin CJC Estley and McIntyre JJ (emphasis added). As 0. Hood 
Phillips comments, [I9821 LQR 194, at 195, the case is remarkable from a consti- 
tutional viewpoint in that the Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction to determine 
whether an alleged constitutional convention exists (viz. on the question whether 
the agreement of the Provinces was required before seeking Westminster amend- 
ment of the Canadian Constitution affecting federal-provincial relations and/or 
rights). Cf. the authorities Hood Phillips cites at  195, where recognised conventions 
have at  most featured incidentally in aid of judicial decision. 
" Supra, at  116. 
I' Zbid., at  115-6 (emphasis added). 
"The Machinery of Government, Public Administration, Vol. XXIV (Autumn 
1946), at 147. 
" Att-Gen. v Jonathan Cape [I9751 3 All ER 484 (see Ellis, supra). 
"Zbid., at  495. 
"In giving expert evidence in Att-Gen. v Jonathan Cope, ibid., at 491 '(per Lord 
Widgery CJ). 
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morality, it lacks the rui~on d'etre of convention.'Vhe second is that in 
the event of a clear breach of the rule no adverse political consequence 
would befall the nation. Significantly, one of the more crude, yet effective, 
tests for determining whether a particular usage is buttressed by the bind- 
ing force of constitutional convention is empirical: namely 'break it and 
see'. Mr Muldoon claims Mr Quigley breached the rule of collective 
cabinet responsibility. But where, it may be asked, is the abuse of power 
occasioned by Mr Quigley which overt breaches of convention ordinarily 
imply? Indeed, not only was Mr Quigley's speech incapable of threatening 
the existing distribution of constitutional authority, but on the contrary 
many would contend that his attempt to concentrate public attention on 
the Government's economic strategies was aimed at enhancing - not 
denigrating - the democratic process. 
This answers what constitutional analysts are agreed are "the crucial 
questions": "the crucial questions must always be whether or not a par- 
ticular class of action is likely to destroy respect for the established distri- 
bution of authority and whether it is likely to maintain respect for the 
constitutional system by changing (or sustaining) the distribution of 
a ~ t h o r i t y . " ~ ~  Regardles\ of politicians' attempts to bolster allegations of 
unconstitutional conduct (that is, regardless of appeals to "constitutional 
convention", actual or otherwise), not in answer to either of these ques- 
tions, it is submitted, is it possible to impugn the former Minister of 
Works and Development. Pro tunto whether his speech was also "political 
ineptitude" as the Prime Minister charges can have no bearing on the 
latter's appeal to the constitution in this instance.31 
One rationale suggested in support of Cabinet unanimity being secured 
by constitutional convention pertains to the perceived interest in maintain- 
ing free and frank discussion between Mini\ters inrer se and their depatt- 
r n e n t ~ . ~ ~  The thought that such discussion was not absolutely privileged 
would, it is supposed, inhibit most Ministers for fear of disclosure and 
public accountability. Lord Widgery CJ accepted this in broad terms in the 
Crossman Diaries case.23 Declaring the premature disclosure of the diaries 
of a former Cabinet Minister to be contrary to the public interest, his Lord- 
ship held that the expressed opinion of Ministers deriving from Cabinet dis- 
cussions are matters of confidence and observed: "[Whereas] [t]o leak a 
cabinet decision a day or so before it is officially announced is an accepted 
exercise in public relations. . . . to identify ministers who voted one way 
or the other is objectionable becauce it undermines the doctrine of joint 
respon~ibility."~~ 
''See Dicey's definition of convention as "a body not of laws, but of constitutional 
or political ethics", the "constitutional morality of the day"; A. V. Dicey, Zntro- 
duction to the Study o f  the Law of  the Corlstitution (10th ed., 1965), at 417 and 
422. 
20Marshall and Moodie, Some Problems o f  the Constitution (5th ed.), at 32. See 
also Sir Ivor Jemings, Cabinet Government (3rd ed.), Ch. 1 .  
" N e w  Zealand Herald, 21 June 1982. 
"But see Eagles, supra, note 8, at 266-68. 
" Supra. 
" Zbid., at 495. 
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Against that, consider the views of three Law Lords in Cotzwuy v 
Rimmer," who rejected or doubted that candour as between Ministers 
inter se and their departmental servants had any appreciable bearing on 
the question of Cabinet confidentiality. L,ord Upjohn: 
"I cannot believe that any Minister or any high level . . . civil servant would 
feel in the least degree inhibited in expressing his honest views in the course of 
his duty on some subject . . . by the thought that his observations might one 
day see the light of day. His worst fear might be libel, and there he has the 
defence of qualified privilege."26 
Lord Morris, to similar effect, summarily dismissed any suggestion to the 
contrary as being "of doubtful ~alidity"."~ And Lord Reid : 
"Virtually everyone agrees that cabinet minutes and the like ought not to be 
disclosed until such time as they are only of historical interest; but I do not think 
that many people would give as the reason that premature disclosure would pre- 
vent candour in the cabinet. To my mind the most important reason i 4  that such 
disclosure would create or fan ill-informed or captious public or political 
criticism."28 
By this and his ensuing comments ("The business of government is 
difficult enough as it is, . . .")2%is Lordship seems to be suggesting there 
is an identifiable public interest in positively suppressing "ill-informed or 
captious public or political criticism". This is a contention over which 
some Ministers might enthuse, but consider the constitutional ramifications. 
First, what Lord Reid preferred to call "captious . . . political criticism" 
is surely the very criticism demanded of any Opposition whose principal 
function in a two-party parliamentary system is to act as an adversary 
(quaere indeed the political justification of an Opposition that is not "fond 
of taking exception or raising  objection^"^'). Secondly, is not the thrust of 
modern government away from fait accornpli decision-making towards 
more open methods of government, specifically that is to assist the "ill- 
informed"?" And thirdly, does not government secrecy leading up to 
ministerial decision merely postpone the unpopularity unpopular decisions 
inevitably invite, yet rendering it too late nonetheless to do  anything 
about it? Observe hence the recent comments of Lord Keith of Kinkel in 
Burrnah Oil Ltd v Bank of England,33 made also in the course of examin- 
ing the question of discovery of documents sought against the Crown 
(concerning communications between Ministers inter se and senior civil 
servants inter se) : 
"There can be discerned in modern times a trend towdrds more open governmental 
methods than were prevalent in the past. . . . This may demand, though no doubt 
" 119681 AC 910, [I9681 1 All ER 874. 
'' [I9681 1 All ER 874, at  915. 
Zbid., at  891. 
"Zbid., at 888. 
" Zbid. 
" "Captious", Oxford Dictionary. 
"Hence the Official Information Bill 1981 presently at  the Select Committee stage. 
"[ 11 9 8 1  AC 1090. 
only in a very limited number of cases, that the inner workings of government 
should be exposed to public gaze, and there may be some who would regard this 
as likely to lead, not to captious or ill-informed criticism, but to criticism calcu- 
lated to improve the nature of that working as affecting the individual citizen..'33 
Here is a judicial pronouncement of the highest authority that executive 
secrecy may be no more justified at Cabinet level today than in the lower 
reaches of the administration. lgnore then (as does Lord Reid in his 
rejection of the candour argumentM) the obvious need to resist disclosure 
of state secrets and perhaps the only perceptible interest left in maintaining 
collective responsibility is the party political interest; the protection of 
which is not the concern of the constitution."" 
It now remains to negative the suggestion earlier noted that the Downie 
Stewart resignation of 1933 is a precedent justifying the Prime Minister's 
call for Mr Quigley's resignation.:io (The political scientists advocating 
this rightly concede that the three further ministerial resignations in New 
Zealand each support the principle of individual ministerial responsibility 
- enjoining a Minister's resignation where properly charged with private 
or public conduct unbecoming to a Minister of the Cr~wn.~ ' )  Professor 
K. C. Scott deemed Downie Stewart's public criticism of the 1931 Coalition 
Government's fiscal measure "the most spectacular departure" from col- 
lective cabinet responsibility "in the history of New Zealand".38 Professor 
Scott lists three reasons: first, the Minister's dissent involved a major 
policy decision of Cabinet (namely, to reduce rents and interest rates); 
secondly, this decision came within the dissentient Minister's own depart- 
mental jurisdiction (that is, in his capacity as Minister of Finance); and 
thirdly, he not only publicly opposed this decision of his colleagues but 
also voted against it in the House. Significantly, the statutc implementing 
the measure, the National Expenditure Adjustment Act 1932, received 
royal assent on 10 May 1932, yet not until January 28 the following year 
- some eight and a half months later - did Downie Stewart resign."" 
Given this effluxion of time between the dissent and resignation. what per- 
suaded Downie Stewart to perform this final public act cannot be attributed 
to his unyielding stance on the rents and interest rates issue. It appears his 
"Zbid., at 1134. But cf., Lord Scarman, at 1144-45 preferring to retain the candour 
argument as a factor to be considered in balancing the public interest in the proper 
functioning of the public service and the public interest in the administration of 
justice (i.e., for purposes of determining whether discovery should be ordered 
against the Crown). 
" Supra., corresponding to note 28. 
=But cf., C1. 7 paras. (d) and (e) of the Official Information Bill 1981 specifying 
the protection of "the principles and conventions of the constitution" and "[tlhe 
full and frank expression by or between or to Ministers of the Crown. . ." as 
providing in the proper case good reason for withholding information. 
"Cited by the political scientists quoted supra, corresponding to notes 6 and 7. 
"Cited were the resignations of George Fisher in 1889 (then Minister of Customs); 
Sir Apirana Ngata in 1934 (then Minister of Native Affairs); and C. J. Eyre in 
1956 (then Minister of Industries and Commerce). For comment, see Scott, 
supra, at 120-24. 
" Zbid., at 115. 
"N.Z.P.D. Vo1. 235 (1933), at ii. 
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was a continuing disagreement with his colleagues over financial policy 
(he was the sole urban voice in a Cabinet dominated by country Reform 
members), and that not until the Government's decision in January 1933 
to devalue did Downie Stewart elect to resign."" 
In fact, if these events establish any precedent it is that Downie Stewart 
and his Coalition partners positively disclaimed any constitutional obli- 
gation encumbent on a dissentient Minister to resign. For following 
Downie Stewart's dissent on the rents and interest rates issue it was 
announced that Cabinet had "agreed to differ".41 Scott notes that Downie 
Stewart's disagreement the following year proved sufficiently embarrassing 
to the Government nonetheless, and that "his resignation was no doubt 
welcomed".42 In other words, if this can be construed as eventually affirm- 
ing the principle of collective responsibility then it does so only in the sense 
that the resignation was politically, not constitutionally, inspired. 
Three further matters warrant mention. First, Scott considers it to be 
an obligatory rule of the constitution that pending a general election a 
party shall agree on a set of broad policies for its election campaign. 
Scott says: "in this one situation a major departure from the principle 
of collective responsibility would not only be a breach of a rule of party 
expediency but also a breach of a convention of the Con~ti tut ion."~~ Scott 
observes that with the strengthening of party discipline it soon became the 
established right of electors to be consulted on broad policies - from 
which the electors could express their choice of government - rather than 
on personalities alone. However, whether Scott is justified in attributing 
the special status of convention to what he himself emphatically regards as 
"only a rule of party expediency between elections"44 can be disposed of 
briefly. 
First, whilst it is invariably the practice for contesting parties to narrow 
the election contest to certain key issues (tactically selected more often 
than not by the encumbent governing party) it is difficult to appreciate 
that this converts the practice into a constitutional obligation demanding 
conformance. Ask any Minister scarcely able to conceal his opposition to 
a particular Cabinet decision, "why do you publicly support that decision 
on the hustings?", it is not likely he will reply "because the constitution 
requires it of me". To the question "what dire consequences would making 
public your dissent herald for the constitution?", he would answer "none". 
But by the same token he would doubtless lament his chances of promo- 
tion within the Cabinet, or of even remaining a frontbencher depending 
on the party's (or leader's) desire to publicly censure; which indicates that 
collective responsibility is no less a rule of pragmatic politics pending a 
general election as it is during the remainder of the parliamentary cycle. 
Secondly, consider the development this century of the Shadow Cabinet. 
Is not this group today as insistent on collective 'ministerial' responsibility, 
"The Oxford History of New Zealand (ed. W. H. Oliver, 1981), at 221, 
UThe terminology adopted from the British "agreement to differ" of a few months 
earlier; for comment see Ellis, supra, at 383-85. 
"Scott, supra, at 115. 
Zbid., at 116-17. 
Zbid., at 118. 
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whereby even those occupying the Opposition frontbenches must toe the 
collective line or 'vacate'? Whether leading up to or following an election 
no one would attempt to explain this practice by reference to convention: 
as one writer concludes with respect to Opposition 'collective responsi- 
bility' in the United Kingdom "[it] is very much a reality, not in the tradi- 
tional sense of being a constitutional convention, but as a manifestation 
of practical politics in the twentieth ~ e n t u r y " . ~ Y e t  if all are agreed as to 
this, in what esential respect does Opposition 'collective responsibility' 
differ from the observed practice of unanimity on the other side of the 
House? 
Finally on this matter, although the opportunity has been taken to rebut 
Professor Scott's concession this should not be read as implying that the 
Prime Minister issued Mr Quigley his "apologi\e or resign" ultimatum on 
the basis of an election-year dissent. 
Secondly, the political scientists quoted above believed it to be a "critical 
ground-rule" of their proclaimed convention that the prerogative of decid- 
ing whether it had been breached was the Prime Minister's ". . .and his 
alone".46 Consequently, "the present Prime Minister, Mr Muldoon, was 
perfectly entitled to dismiss Mr Quigley from his cabinet, it was freely 
conceded, . . ."47 This is instructive, not for their analysis of the constitu- 
tional ramifications of Mr Quigley's speech but because it confirms the 
absence of any ccmstitutioizul principle of collective responsibility. In fact, 
to advocate the Prime Ministerial prerogatives above is to relegate what is 
claimed to be a constitutional convention to a mere indoor-management 
rule of the National Party. 
As is known, the leader of the National Party has a curte hlunche not 
only in the allocation of portfolios to those who will fill the frontbenches 
but also in the actual selection of those persons. In this sense, Mr Mul- 
doon's power to enforce Mr Quigley's removal is undoubted - for that 
purpose, to alone determine whether Mr QuigIey transgressed Cabinet's 
collective responsibility. But if it is constitutional convention that sanctions 
these powers of adjudication and dismissal, they would remain true to 
the constitution regardless of the political party in power. Consider, there- 
fore, the position under a Labour government. Although a Labour Prime 
Minister allocates the portfolios, it is caucus which selects the office- 
holders. It follows that the "critical ground-rules" of which the political 
scientists speak cannot be maintained, because a Labour Prime Minister 
wishing to relegate a dissentient Minister to the backbenches would be 
powerless to do so as long as the Minister retained the support of his 
caucus colleagues. In that event, all the Minister need anticipate would 
be a reallocation of portfolios accompanied by a drop in Cabinet ranking. 
Further, what sense would there be in then saying to the Labour leader, 
"yours is the prerogative alone to determine whether the Minister breached 
the principle of collective cabinet responsibility"? Clearly, there would be 
none since it is the caucus and not the Prime Minister who, under Labour 
Party rules, determines the cornpo%ition of Cabinet. 
Ellis, supra, at 392. 
New Zealand Herald, 21 June 1982. 
" Ibid. 
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Finally, little has been said here about the peculiar status the West- 
minster constitutional democracy accords constitutional convention. 
Although no one definition adequately portrays their they are a 
sui generis body of rules; not laws, yet recognised forms of political behavi- 
our regarded as obligatory. General acceptance by those whom the usage 
agects (the Governor General, Ministers, Members of Parliament, civil 
servants and judges) that there is an obligation to continue to behave in a 
certain way is what renders defiance of constitutional convention as uncon- 
stitutionaI as defiance of the law.49 Indeed, law and convention are closely 
interlocked: "[conventions] provide the flesh which clothes the dry bones 
of the law; they make the legal constitution work".50 Those attuned to the 
more extensive legal form of the codified constitution could not readily 
grasp that some constitutional conventions are vastly more important than 
the bulk of statute and common law connected with the British constitu- 
tional system New Zealand inherited. One English authority instances the 
convention enjoining the Queen to assent to bills duly passed by the Lords 
and Commons (a convention likewise of the New Zealand constitution, 
albeit expressed in terms of the Governor General and our single parlia- 
mentary chambers1). This, he observes, is "overwhelmingly more import- 
ant" than the Queen's strictly legal prerogative power to withhold a~sent.~' 
Although not strictly laws, constitutional conventions ought therefore to be 
treated, he says, as part of constitutional law.s3 
For the reasons above, however, collective ministerial responsibility is 
not of this ilk. Whilst politicians least of anyone would regard the basic 
practice of collective responsibility as being dispensible to politics and the 
process of government as we know it, this does not elevate it into constitu- 
tional convention. Be it not suggested then that the Prime Minister was 
simply the servant of the constitution when on June 11 1982 he issued 
Mr Quigley his "apologise or resign" ultimatum. 
Lecturer, University of Canterbury 
"See generally S. A. de Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (2nd cd., 
1973), 47-63. 
"For judicial acceptance, see Re Amendment of the Constitution of  Canada, 
((S.C.C.), supra, note 12. 
"Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th ed.. 1959), at 81. 
For discussion of the prerogative power it regulates in New Zealand, see Simpson 
v Attorney General [I9551 NZLR 271, per Stanton and Hutchison JJ. 
" S. A. de Smith, supra, note 48, at 47. 
' Zbid. 
